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OUT IN THE OPEN: STATE EX REL. CASTER V. CITY OF 
COLUMBUS AND THE EXPANSION OF OHIO PUBLIC RECORDS 
LAW 
Andrew S. Radin* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Public records have not always been so public. Since 1993, a 
defendant’s ability to pursue postconviction relief has been stifled 
because of an inability to retrieve and review certain public records.1 In 
State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided 
that Ohio Revised Code §149.43(A)(2)(c) (specifically, “R.C. § 
149.43(A)(2)(c), and Ohio Revised Code § 149.43, generally, “R.C. § 
149.43”) and Ohio Criminal Rule 16 (“Ohio Crim.R. 16”) precluded 
organizations and persons from discovering investigatory reports 
through public records requests due to the fact that those records were 
“confidential law enforcement investigatory records.”2 In pertinent part, 
Steckman v. Jackson held “information assembled by law enforcement 
officials with a probable or pending criminal proceeding is, but the work 
product exception found in R.C. § 149.43(A)(2)(c), exception from 
required release as said information is compiled in anticipation of 
litigation.”3 In State ex rel. WLWTt-Tv5 v. Leis, the Supreme Court of 
Ohio determined that those records were exempt from release until all 
trials and proceedings were completed, a near impossible standard to 
meet.4 While some cities and departments were willing to part with such 
records when the convicted sought appellate relief, others stonewalled at 
every turn.5  
After twenty years of spawned progeny and changes to the Ohio 
Criminal Rule at issue, the exception finally met it demise. A public 
records dispute between Donald R. Caster, an attorney for the Ohio 
Innocence Project, and the City of Columbus, Ohio, resulted in the 
Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State ex. Rel. Caster v. City of 
Columbus, the case that would overturn Steckman and Leis, and change 
 
* Andrew S. Radin, University of Cincinnati College of Law 2018. For purposes of transparency, I 
worked for the Ohio Innocence Project when this case was decided. 
 1. State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 89 N.E.3d 598 (Ohio 2016). 
 2. State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 639 N.E.2d 83 (Ohio 1994). Confidential Law 
Enforcement Investigatory Records are most commonly referred to in Ohio as the CLEIRS exception. 
This author will spell it out each time to ensure consistency between quotes and the author’s own 
thoughts. 
 3. Id. at 94-95. 
 4. See State ex rel. Wlwt-Tv5 v. Leis, 673 N.E.2d 1365 (Ohio 1997). 
 5. Caster, 89 N.E.3d 598.  
1
Radin: Out in the Open: State ex rel. Caster v. City of Columbus and the
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
872 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 
the face of Ohio public records law.6  
This article analyzes the history leading up to the case, including the 
Ohio Revised Code sections, the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(“Ohio Crim.R.”) at play, and Steckman and its progeny it spawned. It 
argues that although Steckman needed to be overturned, it was not 
necessarily decided incorrectly in 1993. This article further discusses the 
factors that lead to Steckman needing to be overturned. The article 
concludes with an analysis of State ex. Rel. Caster v. City of Columbus, 
and the implications of the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision moving 
forward.   
II.  BACKGROUND 
This section explores the background behind State ex rel. Caster, 
beginning with an introduction to criminal discovery, followed by Ohio 
Revised Code § 149.43(A)(2)(c), Ohio Crim.R. 16 and the role it played 
in the history of the case, and the case law that was eventually 
overturned, including the principal case, State ex rel. Steckman v. 
Jackson, as well as State ex rel. WLWT-Tv5 v. Leis, and State v. Athon. 
The last section of the Background explores are the records still 
excepted from discovery in the wake of State ex rel. Caster v. City of 
Columbus. 
A.  A Sky-High Review of Ohio Criminal Discovery 
Ohio Crim.R. 16 governs criminal discovery in Ohio. 16.7 Its intent is 
“to provide all parties in a criminal case with the information necessary 
for a full and fair adjudication of the facts.”8 This includes defendants, 
witnesses, victims, and society at large.9 The defense makes demands 
for discovery at the earlier of two possible dates, those being within 
twenty days of arraignment or seven days before the date of trial.10 Once 
demanded by the defense, discovery begins.11  
In those demands, defense counsel, presuming an adequately pleaded 
demand, may request certain statements, criminal records, laboratory or 
hospital records, physical or mental exams, any evidence favorable to 
the defendant, reports by officers, or written or recorded statements by 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16.  
 8. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(A). 
 9. Id.  
 10. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(M).  
 11. Id.  
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witnesses in the case-in-chief. 12 Exceptions apply, including the 
designation of counsel-only material, work product, transcripts of grand 
jury testimony, and privilege, among others.13 
Once discovery is initiated, there is now a reciprocal obligation to 
supplement disclosures to ensure fairness in proceedings.14 For example: 
when prosecution provides witness lists, the defense must provide any 
witness lists.15 It is within the discretion of the trial court to address non-
compliance with Crim.R. 16.16 When a party refuses to produce the 
requested information, the opposing party may move to compel 
disclosure of certain evidence.17 The court may issue orders compelling 
discovery or inspection to ensure equity.18  
B.  Ohio Revised Code §149.43(A)(2)(c)19 
Section 149.43 of the Ohio Revised Code deals with the 
“[a]vailability of public records of inspection and copying.”20 At issue in 
this discussion is R.C. § 149.43(A)(2)(c), which excludes “confidential 
law enforcement investigatory record[s],” from release, though only 
those that would “create a high probability of disclosure of . . .  
[s]pecific confidential investigatory techniques or procedures or specific 
investigatory work product,” among other exceptions.21 What constitutes 
such a record was one of the issues in Steckman, and the court included 
in the definition “information assembled by law enforcement officials in 
connection with a probable or pending criminal proceeding.”22 
Obviously, such a definition significantly broadens the already broad 
exception. 
C.  Criminal Rule 16 
Criminal Rule 16 looks markedly different now than it did at the time 
 
 12. Id. Both sides have the authority to not disclose information if there is an insufficient/non-
particular demand.  
 13. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(C) & (J). 
 14. Id, at (A) & (H). 
 15. Id. at (J). 
 16. Id. at (F). 
 17. Id. at (M). 
 18. See id. 
 19. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (West 2017). 
 20. Id. 
 21. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43(A)(2)(c).   
 22. State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 639 N.E.2d 83, 94-95 (Ohio 1994); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16 
(1973). 
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of Steckman.23 As such, what follows is an analysis and explanation of 
(1) Crim.R. 16 as it stood in 1993 at the time of Steckman, and (2) 
Crim.R. 16 as it looks after the 2010 amendments. 
1.  Criminal Rule 16 (1973 Version) 
The old rule Crim.R. 16 was less equitable than its modern 
counterpart, which is to blame for the eventual litigation of Steckman. 
Crim.R. 16 did not “provide for what is often called ‘full,’ ‘complete,’ 
or ‘open file’ discovery.”24 This meant that defense attorneys could not 
readily obtain all files the prosecution had access to, as was laid out in 
Crim.R. 16(B)(2).25 This included “reports, memoranda, or other 
internal investigation documents made by the prosecuting attorney or his 
agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case, or 
of statements made by witnesses or prospective witnesses to state 
agents.”26 Defense attorneys frequently wanted access to such 
documents through Crim.R. 16, but were often steadfastly denied.27   
To circumvent the roadblock, defense attorneys went outside the 
bounds of Crim.R. 16(C), and instead pursued discovery by other 
means, including requesting public records to get information they 
otherwise would not have access under the rule. Defense attorneys 
requested public records to get information they otherwise would not 
have access under the rule.28 The benefits of this were that (1) defense 
attorneys had access to information that would otherwise not be 
disclosed under Crim.R. 16(C); (2) there was no reciprocal obligation 
triggered that allowed inspection by the prosecution; and (3) the 
prosecution had no similar ability to get information outside the scope of 
the rule.29  
Because the defense’s records were not public record, there was no 
reciprocal ability for the prosecution to engage in the same practice.30 
This meant that defense attorneys had access to records outside the 
scope of Crim.R. 16, but prosecutors did not. This lack of reciprocal 
discovery became a contentious issue, ultimately resulting in the 
litigation to be discussed at length below. 
 
 23. See State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 89 N.E.3d 598 (Ohio 2016). 
 24. Steckman, 639 N.E.2d at 89-91.  
 25. Id 
 26. Id. at 95. 
 27. See id.  
 28. Id. at 89-91; State ex rel. Wlwt-Tv5 v. Leis, 673 N.E.2d 1365 (Ohio 1997). 
 29. See Steckman, 639 N.E.2d at 89-90. 
 30. Id. 
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2. Criminal Rule 16 – 2010 
The 2010 amendments to Crim.R. 16 marked a sweeping overhaul of 
discovery in Ohio, and a departure from the rule that once plagued Ohio 
courts.31 The new Crim.R. 16(A) addressed and amended the lack of 
reciprocity absent in the old rule.32 In pertinent part, the rule states: “All 
duties and remedies are subject to a standard of due diligence, apply to 
the defense and the prosecution equally, and are intended to be 
reciprocal.”33 The staff notes for Crim.R. 16(A) expand upon this, 
stating, “Nothing in this rule shall inhibit the parties from exchanging 
greater discovery beyond the scope of this rule . . . and expands the 
reciprocal duties in the exchange of materials.”34 
The new rule gives the judge similar and more expansive regulatory 
authority.35 Whereas the old rule had discretion to deny, restrict, or defer 
discovery within the bounds of the rule, the new rule allows the court to 
make orders when “a party has failed to comply with this rule or with an 
order pursuant to this rule.”36 This includes the ability to order 
“discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit [a] party from 
introducing in evidence the material not disclosed.”37 While facially 
similar to the 1973 Crim.R. 16, the new rule creates an efficient way of 
dealing with evidence obtained outside the bounds of the Crim.R. 16. 
D.  Case Law 
The following section examines the case law leading up State ex rel. 
Caster v. City of Columbus. First, an examination of State ex rel. 
Steckman v. Jackson, the principal case overturned by State ex rel. 
Caster; second, an examination State ex rel. WLWT-Tv5 v. Leis, a 
subsequent Supreme Court of Ohio case that expands upon principles 
laid out in Steckman v. Jackson; lastly, an examination of State v. Athon, 
a case dealing with issues following the 2010 Amendment to Ohio 
Crim.R. 16. 
 
 31. See State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 89 N.E.3d 598 (Ohio 2016); see also Paul Aker, 
Towards Darkness: Ohio’s Presumption of Openness Under the Public Records Act, 41 CAP. U.L. REV. 
361 (2013). 
 32. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(A). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. 
 36. Compare OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16.; with OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16 (1973). 
 37. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16. 
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1.  State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson 
 Steckman was a consolidation of three cases.38 The purpose of the 
case was to address the ever-increasing use of R.C. § 149.43 to obtain 
records unobtainable under Crim.R. 16.39 The strategy utilized by 
defense attorneys caused undue delay in criminal proceedings and gave 
defense attorneys a leg-up by providing access to prosecutor files.40 
 The scheme orchestrated by defense attorneys to obtain records they 
were not entitled to under Crim.R. 16 was admittedly cunning. Ohio 
Crim.R. 16 did not allow for open file discovery.41 This left defense 
attorneys yearning for more.42 Given that a prosecutor’s file contains 
numerous public records and because there was not a statutory limitation 
on an attorney’s ability to request such records, defense attorneys went 
outside the bounds of Crim.R.16 and requested public records.43 When 
those public records requests were denied, lawyers could use mandamus 
to force legal action to obtain those records.44 This, in turn “[brought] 
about interminable delay in [] criminal proceedings.”45  
 While this arguably was a useful tactic, it was inequitable because 
prosecutors lacked the reciprocal right to obtain the same investigatory 
records from its opposition.46 For that reason, among other policy 
considerations, the court held that in a “criminal proceeding itself, a 
defendant may use only Crim.R. 16 to obtain discovery.”47 The decision 
did not end there, however, as the court needed to determine at what 
point certain records would become available.48   
“Because of our cases, the exceptions to required disclosure found in 
R.C.  § 149.43(A)(2)(c)—‘specific investigatory work product’—and 
R.C. § 149.43(A)(4)—‘trial preparation record’—have virtually been 
rendered meaningless.”49 Further, the court noted that they “just about 
[wrote] Rule 16 out of the Criminal Rules.”50 Exceptions that were once 
meant to ensure equitable discovery, secure witness protection, and to 
address a host of other policy considerations, now lacked luster.51  
 
 38. State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 639 N.E.2d 83, 83-89 (Ohio 1994).  
 39. Id. at 88-89. 
 40. Id. at 89-95. 
 41. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16 (1973). 
 42. See Steckman, 639 N.E.2d 83. 
 43. See Steckman, 639 N.E.2d at 89-95.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 89-90. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 90-91.  
 48. See id. 
 49. Id. at 91-92. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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The work product excepted from disclosure by the court in Steckman 
includes “information assembled by law enforcement officials in 
connection with a probable or pending criminal proceeding . . . as said 
information is compiled in anticipation of litigation.”52 The court 
deemed “ongoing routine offense and incident reports, including . . . 
records relating to a charge of driving while under the influence and 
records containing the results of intoxilyzer reports,” as not work 
product.53 Further limiting the ability of criminal defendants to access 
public records, the court stated, “A defendant in a criminal case who has 
exhausted the direct appeals of her or his conviction may not avail 
herself or himself of R.C. § 149.43 to support a petition for 
postconviction relief.”54 Taken as a whole, Steckman disallowed the 
disclosure of any investigatory work product under R.C. § 
149.43(A)(2)(c).55 
Although not immediately apparent in Steckman itself, the court’s 
ruling on trial preparation records under R.C. § 149.43(A)(4) and R.C. § 
149.43(A)(1)(G) would have severe limiting effects in subsequent court 
decisions.56 In its opinion, the court noted that “[trial preparation records 
do] not lose . . . exempt status unless and until all ‘trials,’ ‘actions’ 
and/or ‘proceedings’ have been fully completed.”57 The court found no 
conclusive definition of “trial,” and therefore indicated that there should 
be no distinction between “an initial court proceeding, [a] direct appeal[] 
and/or postconviction relief.”58 Although limited to records under R.C. § 
149.43(A)(4), the court would only further expand the exceedingly 
broad scope of its power to except records.59 
2.  State ex rel. WLWT-Tv5 v. Leis 
State ex rel. WLWT-Tv5 v. Leis (“Leis”) is one of the progeny of 
Steckman. Following Steckman, there were still some ambiguous issues 
regarding how long certain public records were exempted form 
disclosure under R.C. § 149.43.60 WLWT, a local TV station, sought to 
compel the Ohio Brotherhood of Deputy Sheriffs to release records 
relating to a case in which several of its members were indicted and 
 
 52. Id. at 94-96. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 95-96. 
 55. Id. 
 56. State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 89 N.E.3d 598 (Ohio 2016). 
 57. Steckman, 639 N.E.2d at 92-93. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See State ex rel. Wlwt-Tv5 v. Leis, 673 N.E.2d 1365 (Ohio 1997). 
 60. See id.  
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charged.61 WLWT claimed the “work product and trial preparation 
records [were] inapplicable” because all of the involved defendants had 
already been charged, and two defendants were already convicted and 
sentenced.62  
The court was quick to dismiss the argument, using Steckman as its 
principal reason for denying the disclosure of the records.63 In arguing 
why Steckman applied despite the trial and sentencing having already 
occurred, the court cited the exemptions found in R.C. § 149.43(A)(2)(c) 
and R.C. § 149.43(A)(4).64 The court lumped them both under the 
umbrella heading of R.C. § 149.43(A)(1) and found no issue in labeling 
the work product as trial preparation records.65 Because the 
investigatory work product was located in the prosecutor’s file, it was 
also considered part of the trial preparation record under R.C. § 
149.43(A)(4).66 This exempted from disclosure all investigatory work 
product until all “proceeding[s], direct appeals and/or postconviction 
relief” had been completed.67  
As we know from Steckman, it is a high bar for all proceedings, direct 
appeals, and postconviction relief to be completed under the standard. 
As the court in Leis stated, “further proceedings on these offenses are 
possible because they could be granted a new trial pursuant to (1) 
Crim.R. 32.1, permitting the withdrawal of their guilty and no contest 
pleas, or (2) a petition for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21.”68 
In short, there were very few, if any, ways for a defendant to compel 
disclosure of these records.  
While the four corners of Steckman seemed reasonable to the extent 
that they allowed for more equitable discovery at trial, Leis heightened 
the standard to compel disclosure of police records to an even higher 
standard. Although some municipalities and cities in Ohio disclose such 
records in postconviction settings, others do not because the defense 
using Steckman and Leis is so strong.69 This is due in part to the fact that 
the court did not want the defendant to have any more information on 
“retrial than he or she could have gained through Crim.R. 16 discovery 
for the original trial.”70 However, the reworking of Crim.R. 16 remedied 
that concern. 
 
 61. Id. at 1365-68. 
 62. Id. at 1368-69. 
 63. Id. at 1369-70. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 1368. 
 67. Id. at 1368-69 (quoting State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 639 N.E.2d 83 (Ohio 1994)). 
 68. Id.. 
 69. Aker, supra note 31.  
 70. State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 89 N.E.3d 598, 608 (Ohio 2016). 
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3.  State v. Athon 
State v. Athon provided evidence of how the reworked Crim.R. 16 
remedied glaring issues in the construction of the rule at the time of 
Steckman. In Athon, attorney Steven Adams represented a man charged 
with “operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, 
speeding, and failing to reinstate his driver’s license.”71 Adams did not 
participate in discovery pursuant to Crim.R. 16, instead asking another 
attorney to request the public records related to the case for him.72 The 
files requested were all files that could have been compelled under 
Crim.R. 16.73 
The attorney requested the files and received them several days 
later.74 The State, having found out about the straw man, asked the court 
to compel discovery because of the reciprocal duty located in Crim.R. 
16(H).75 One way to look at Athon’s argument is simply that a third 
party requesting public records did not amount to a demand to trigger 
the reciprocal obligation because he did not make a pretrial motion, and 
since he did not make the demand, there was no reciprocal obligation.76 
Athon argued he was only prevented from obtaining “evidence that is 
not subject to discovery pursuant to Crim.R. 16.”77 The court was forced 
to answer whether the accused “may request public records to obtain 
information that could be demanded from the state during discovery, 
and . . . whether such a request triggers a reciprocal duty of disclosure to 
the state.”78 
The court found that “the Public Records Act is neither a substitute 
nor an alternative to criminal discovery conducted pursuant to Crim.R. 
16.”79 This mimics language used in Steckman twenty years prior, 
further entrenching the precedent that discovery should be kept within 
the bounds of Crim.R. 16.80 However, given that Crim.R. 16 was 
amended since the Steckman decision, the court took a step further in its 
analysis. The accused could make a request for public records that could 
have been obtained through discovery “directly or indirectly,” but that 
request would amount to a demand under Crim.R. 16 and the accused 
 
 71. State v. Athon, 989 N.E.2d 1006, 1007-08 (Ohio 2013). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1007-10. 
 75. Id. at 1008-10. 
 76. Id. at 1009-10. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1011-12. 
 80. Compare State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 639 N.E.2d 83 (Ohio 1994), with Athon, 989 
N.E.2d 1006. 
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would then owe a reciprocal duty of disclosure to the prosecutor.81  
 Athon was a good case to test the durability of the new reciprocal 
discovery standard promulgated by the updated Crim.R. 16. Although 
the case was limited to public records that could have been obtained 
within the scope of Crim.R. 16, it laid some of the groundwork for 
further cases to be decided under the new Crim.R. 16.82 The reciprocal 
duty of the rule “minimized any perceived advantage a defendant could 
gain on retrial through the use of a public-records request.”83 With that, 
the table was set for further erosion of the standards set in Steckman and 
Leis. 
E.  State ex rel. Caster v. City of Columbus 
The following discussion of State ex rel. Caster v. City of Columbus 
begins with a short recitation of the facts, followed by an analysis of the 
legal issues and arguments presented and analyzed by the court. 
1.  Facts 
In the course of its investigation into the murder conviction of Adam 
Saleh, Donald Caster,84 through two law students working under his 
direction, requested police records related to the investigation and 
subsequent arrest of Saleh.85 While there was no guarantee the Ohio 
Innocence Project would litigate the case, the public records were 
necessary in determining whether or not Saleh’s claim of actual 
innocence was credible.86  
Caster’s requests to the Division of Police (“DOP”)—through 
students working for him—were fully denied.87 The DOP cited 
Steckman v. Jackson as its rationale for not turning over the files 
because the information sought fell under the R.C. § 149.43(A)(2)(c) 
investigatory work product exception.88 Despite the fact that all appeals 
had been exhausted, the “DOP stated that no records would be produced 
until the ‘completion’ of Saleh’s criminal case.”89 Caster then sent, 
 
 81. Athon, 989 N.E.2d at 1011-12.  
 82. See State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 89 N.E.3d 598 (Ohio 2016). 
 83. Id. at 607-08. 
 84. Donald Caster is an attorney for the Ohio Innocence Project and Clinical Professor of Law at 
the University of Cincinnati College of Law. The Ohio Innocence Project identifies, investigates, and 
litigates cases in which inmates in Ohio prisons might have been wrongfully convicted. 
 85. See Id. at 600. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 599-600. 
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through certified mail, a request directly from himself, explaining that 
there were no ongoing proceedings in Saleh’s case.90 The DOP never 
responded.91 
Caster then filed an original mandamus action with the court, at 
which point the DOP released some, but not all, of the records.92 The 
DOP again cited the holdings of Steckman and its progeny to deny the 
records.93 The case reached the Supreme Court of Ohio. 
2.  Argument and Holding 
The court initially noted that the jurisprudence in this area of law is 
based on expedience, “the idea that a defendant should not be able to 
have more information on retrial than he or she could have gained 
through Crim.R. 16 discovery for the original trial.”94 The changes to 
Crim.R. 16 remedied those concerns, and there is no longer sizable 
disparity in the discovery process. 
The court was most persuaded by the uncanny story of one of the 
appellants in the consolidated cases of Steckman.95 His convictions were 
affirmed on appeal.96 Ronald Larkins sought recovery of investigatory 
records related to his case, but was steadfastly denied because he could 
not use them to support a motion for postconviction relief.97  
Eventually another person filed a public records request that was 
granted, and the records were turned over.98 Larkins found exculpatory 
evidence that was withheld, and he was eventually granted a new trial 
and his indictment was dismissed.99 But for the Cleveland Police 
department accidentally letting the public records request slip through, 
Larkins would likely be serving time for a crime he did not commit. The 
 
 90. Id. at 600-01.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 608. 
 95. Id. at 608-09. 
 96. Id; State v. Saleh, No. 07AP-431, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 1407 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 
2009). 
 97. See Caster, 89 N.E.3d 598; Ronald Larkins, NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (April 
4, 2014), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4415. (Ronald 
Larkins was convicted of attempted murder and robbery in 1986, and he was sentenced to life without 
parole. He filed a postconviction motion for police files in his case, but was denied at the Supreme Court 
in State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson. Once his records were turned over – for reasons unknown – in 
2001, Larkins demonstrated that the prosecution withheld evidence that ultimately would have proved 
his innocence at trial. After several years of litigation, charges against Larkins were dismissed because 
of the prosecution’s misconduct in failing to disclose exculpatory evidence. A full record of his case is 
available on the National Registry of Exonerations.) 
 98. Caster, 89 N.E.3d 598. 
 99. Id. 
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court’s thought on this incident was as follows: “Larkins gained access 
to the records that led to the dismissal of his indictment only through an 
act of bureaucratic grace. Or a bureaucratic mistake. Whichever the 
case, a clear rule would be better and is necessary.”100 
This new rule, while informed by anecdotes such as Larkins’, was 
promulgated in the interests of justice and because of the newly leveled 
disparity between information available through the Public Records Act 
and through Crim.R. 16 discovery. As such, they held “that the specific-
investigatory-work-product exception of R.C. § 149.43(A)(2)(c) does 
not extend beyond the completion of the trial for the information was 
gathered.”101 The writ was granted, and Saleh’s files should have been 
turned over to relator Caster.102 To the extent that Steckman and Leis 
held otherwise, they were overruled.103 
The court’s newly promulgated rule is bright line: when a trial ends, 
the records become available. The parity that now exists under Crim.R. 
16 creates an environment in which this rule has the capacity to level the 
playing field more than it did pre-Steckman.104 As discussed, the issue in 
Steckman was the ability of defense counsel to access through R.C. § 
149.43 what they could not access through Crim.R.16. Defense counsel 
had access to records that the state did not, and time-consuming 
litigation slowed the courts. With the 2010 amendment to Crim.R. 16, 
this loophole was effectively shut because of the requirement for 
reciprocal discovery. After being put to the test in State v. Athon, the 
decision in State ex rel. Caster was a sensible next step in adapting to 
the recently promulgated Crim.R. 16. 
If defense counsel seek public records during trial, then that action 
triggers reciprocal discovery. If defense counsel seeks work-product 
during trial, that material is exempt from disclosure. Once the trial ends, 
those public records can be accessed, and that investigatory work-
product must be disclosed upon demand. Thais, in short, is the holding 
of State ex rel. Caster v. City of Columbus. While the dissent 
acknowledges the change in law, it interprets it much differently. 
3.  Dissent 
The dissent’s primary focus was on keeping work-product exceptions 
in place in light of the new Crim.R. 16.105 Chief Justice O’Connor would 
 
 100. Id. at 608-09. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. . 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. at 611 ( O'Connor, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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instead “modify Steckman’s definition of the specific-investigatory-
work-product exception.”106 
The dissent’s proposed definition found its footing in the language of 
Hickman v. Taylor.107 There was recognition that the concerns addressed 
in Steckman no longer exist, but the dissent found the lack of a 
manageable work product standard under the new rule grossly 
understated.108 The crux of the dissent’s proposed definition was the 
delineation between “fact work product” and “theories, impressions, and 
strategies.”109 The specific investigatory work product of law 
enforcement was, in the dissent’s view, analogous to the attorney-work-
product jurisprudence.110 
The public should have access to facts uncovered during the course of 
an investigation, but police should not be forced to give up confidential 
investigatory techniques.111 Knowledge of such techniques could 
“empower criminals to avoid detections, [and] is dangerous.”112 Instead 
of releasing all records, the decision to release certain records should 
only come after in camera review.113 
The dissent also strayed from the majority in finding the specific-
investigatory-work-product exception extends past completion of a 
trial.114 The dissent agreed trial-preparation records that were part of a 
law-enforcement file were unnecessary to keep from the defendant 
following the exhaustion of direct appeals, but found information 
protected by R.C. § 149.43(A)(2) should be protected even following 
the dissolution of all direct appeals.115 
One of the biggest issues the dissent found with the majority’s 
decision is the recreation of the problem at issue in Steckman.116 While 
this problem could not occur as the trial level because of the new 
Crim.R. 16, the disclosures of specific investigatory work product after 
trial but before the exhaustion of direct appeals were just a recreation of 
the Steckman issue at the appellate level.117 In pertinent part, the dissent 
thought the issue was “giving the public (and potentially the defendant) 
access to information in the investigatory file that was not available to 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. at 613. 
 109. Id. at 613-614. 
 110. Id. at  
 111. Id. at 613. 
 112. Id. at 614. 
 113. Id. at  
 114. Id, at 613. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. Id. at 614. 
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the defendant during trial and opening a second level of potential 
discovery through a public-records request between a trial verdict and 
defendant’s direct appeal.”118 
Further, the dissent tried flipping the anecdote of the innocent man 
from the majority opinion into an argument as to why records should not 
be disclosed.119 The reasoning was that if the defendant were innocent, 
the actual perpetrator could use public records to evade detection.120 In 
its entirety, the dissenting opinion did not want to overhaul Steckman. 
F.  What is Still Excepted from Discovery? 
Despite the expansive holding of the case, there are a number of 
exceptions under R.C. § 149.43(A)(2) that allow the state to withhold 
information for fairly good reasons.121 
The Division of Police can still withhold information under R.C. § 
149.43(A)(2)(a), which pertains to information relating to the identity of 
a suspect who was not charged.122 This is sensible to keep intact for the 
safety of the suspect and to prevent any sort of vigilante justice; 
however, one downside to this is that investigations on appeal might be 
stifled by lack of full access to suspects and potential leads. They can 
also withhold information under R.C. § 149.43(A)(2)(b), which relates 
to information that could lead to the unmasking of a confidential 
informant.123 Also, under R.C. § 149.43(A)(2)(c), some specific 
investigatory techniques are exempt.124 Lastly, under R.C. § 
149.43(A)(2)(d), information that threatens the safety of law 
enforcement, victims, witnesses, or confidential informants is also 
exempt from disclosure.125 
The above Ohio revised Code sections represent sensible exemptions 
from disclosure, and demonstrate the limitations still placed on 
discovery in the wake of State ex rel. Caster v. City of Columbus. 
III.  DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS  
This section analyzes why State ex rel. Caster was decided correctly 
and the implications it has moving forward. The discussion includes 
 
 118. Id. at 615. 
 119. Id. at 614. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 609-10; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §149.43 (West 2017). 
 122. Caster, 89 N.E.3d 598 at 609-10.  
 123. Id 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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how the decision represents a sensible adaption of jurisprudence to new 
statutory standards; why the dissent’s idea only would have exacerbated 
issues with discovery; and how police departments could still find ways 
to exempt materials from disclosure. This is followed by an analysis of 
the impact the case will have and already had in the area of conviction 
appeals and the work towards proving innocence.  
A.  Why the Court was Correct 
The Ohio Legislature passed R.C. § 149.43 in 1963 with the intention 
of making all records held by Ohio governmental agencies available for 
public review.126 The legislature wanted a simple and open process for 
obtaining records.127 But, as seen in the facts in Steckman, simplicity 
came at a great cost. The expedient operation of the courts was a central 
issue in Steckman; litigation over public records caused by the 
tumultuous interplay of R.C. § 149.43 and Ohio Crim.R 16 too often 
burdened the judicial economy of courts.128 An already busy criminal 
justice system was made busier. Instead of relying on the legislature to 
remedy the statutory issues involved, the court created a judicial remedy 
to the problems they saw in the system. Steckman lead to a series of 
cases that fit a similar mold.129 What was left was a flawed public 
records law and jurisprudence that made tighter and tighter restrictions. 
Though there were amendments to R.C. § 149.43 and Ohio Crim.R. 
16 between Steckman and State ex rel. Caster, most were not sweeping 
enough to convince the court to change its position.130 The court 
presumably still feared the floodgates would reopen if they returned to 
pre-Steckman standards. The exception comes with the 2010 amendment 
to Ohio Crim.R. 16, discussed in Section II(B)(2) above. The new rule 
explicitly allows for discovery outside the scope of Ohio Crim.R. 16, 
though with the caveat that a reciprocal duty applies.131 This remedied 
one of the major issues with the rule at the time of Steckman, namely 
that defense counsel seemingly had greater access to records than the 
prosecution.132 
The limits of the rule were tested in State v Athon, discussed above, 
when non-counsel sought public records related to a case to turn over to 
 
 126. Aker, supra note 31, at 370.  
 127. Id. at 370-371. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 370-371. 
 130. Id. at 370-371. 
 131. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16.  
 132. State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 639 N.E.2d 83 (Ohio 1994); compare OHIO R. CRIM. P. 
16; but compare OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16 (1973).  
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the acting counsel.133 As discussed, the court found a reciprocal 
obligation in that act. Athon, albeit an odd case and fact pattern, was a 
necessary precursor to State ex rel. Caster v. City of Columbus. In 
demonstrating Crim.R. 16 now has recognizable limits not present pre-
Steckman, the court could begin reworking precedent set because of pre-
Steckman issues. 
At the time Steckman was decided, the major issues with public 
records were at trial. Once Steckman was decided and the equity of 
discovery was preserved, the court took it further in Leis to preserve an 
advantage in appellate proceedings.134 While it is certainly arguable that 
there was an issue with public records litigation pre-Steckman, the need 
to extend such a bar past trial was always set upon rocky footing. 
Larkins is too perfect of an example.  
Larkins was denied access to his public records as a direct result of 
the Steckman decision; he was one of the consolidated cases being 
presented before the Ohio Supreme Court in Steckman v. Jackson.135 
Larkins was ultimately set free by the mistaken release of his records. 
This should have acted as a wake-up call to the courts or the legislature 
in 2006. The appellate court even noted: 
 
While [the] refusal [to disclose public records] was ultimately 
found to be justified by the Supreme Court in Steckman . . . it could 
be argued . . . that the state’s strenuous opposition to disclosing 
records was meant to cover its failure to divulge that evidence prior 
to trial.136 
 
Despite such an obvious condemnation of the state’s tactics, there 
was no change in Ohio public records law.137 According to the National 
Registry of Exonerations, 56 Ohio men and women were exonerated 
during Steckman’s tenure.138 Some undoubtedly were lucky in their 
ability to recover public records related to their case, but who knows 
how many countless more have been denied due process because they 
could not obtain public records related to their case. 
When Donald Caster sought public records for Adam Saleh, he did 
 
 133. State v. Athon, 989 N.E.2d 1006 (Ohio 2013).  
 134. State ex rel. Wlwt-Tv5 v. Leis, 673 N.E.2d 1365 (Ohio 1997).  
 135. Steckman, 639 N.E.2d 83.  
 136. State v. Larkins, No. 85877, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 80, at *23 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 12, 
2006). 
 137. This change, of course, came in 2010 with the amendments to Ohio Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 16 and the Caster case. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16; State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 89 N.E.3d 598 
(Ohio 2016).   
 138. Ronald Larkins, NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (April 4, 2014), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4415.  
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not know whether or not Saleh was actually innocent of the crimes he 
was convicted of committing.139 The only way Caster and the Ohio 
Innocence Project could know was by gaining access to those records.140 
I am sure Caster was not entirely optimistic about how the case would 
be resolved, given that Steckman was so engrained in the fabric of Ohio 
criminal procedure. It was tough but worthwhile not just for Caster, but 
for those who could not challenge their convictions because not all 
“‘trials,’ ‘actions’ and/or ‘proceedings’ ha[d] been fully completed.”141 
The ambiguous standards beget pro-State policies that operated to 
preserve prosecutorial advantage and cover-up official misconduct in the 
name of judicial efficiency. 
State ex rel. Caster was decided correctly because it gives power back 
to those who had all their power taken away. The ruling does not disturb 
the expedience of trial courts; rather, it acts as a necessary check on the 
State.  
B.  What the Dissent Gets Wrong  
As discussed in the earlier section, the dissenting opinion facially 
appears to call for a return to the status quo. The difference from the 
status quo is where the argument finds its footing. In the dissenting 
opinion of State ex rel. Caster, the judge used the language of Hickman 
v. Taylor more so than the language of the statute and rules at issue. The 
three major themes present in the dissent are (1) the court gave 
defendants too much access to public records between trial and direct 
appeal, (2) releasing mental impressions implicated work-product 
issues, and (3) criminals would use public records to their advantage.142 
These will be addressed in turn. 
The first issue—defendants would have too much access to 
information on direct appeal—is an interesting position. The judge 
stated that allowing access to public records before direct appeals were 
exhausted would “re-create the problem that Steckman sought to 
address.”143 The judge would “protect the file either until law 
enforcement closes a case or until there is no longer a likelihood that a 
verdict will be reconsidered – after the defendant has exhausted his or 
her direct-appeal options.”144 Although there are avenues to find success 
 
 139. Caster, 89 N.E.3d  at 600.  “Actual innocence” is a legal term of art that refers to a situation 
in which a convicted defendant is innocent of all charges. Actual innocence does not include those who 
are guilty but were convicted due to an error in the court.  
 140. Id. 
 141. Steckman, 639 N.E.2d at 92-93. 
 142. See Caster, 89 N.E.3d at 611 (O’Connor, C.J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 143. Id. at 615. 
 144. Id.  
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on direct appeal without public records, many cases rely on the ability to 
access public records for the likelihood of their verdict to be 
reconsidered.145 There is reason to restrict access at trial to preserve the 
adversarial process, but appeals are meant to correct deficiencies and 
mistakes at trial, many that might not come to light without access to 
public records. Much like the majority’s opinion in Steckman, the 
dissenting opinion here premised much of its argument on issues of 
expediency. The legislature has already moved towards a more open-file 
discovery process, but the dissent seemingly did not want to follow 
legislative intent.  
Second, the releasing of mental impressions was the opinion’s most 
well-grounded argument. Chief Justice O’Connor opined that the 
majority “opens the door for disclosure well beyond even Crim.R. 16 
requires, and it does so without any of the safeguards that the rule and 
R.C. § 149.43(A)(2) put in place.”146 Instead of such an expansive rule, 
the judge believes that only facts should be subject to disclosure, not 
“theories, mental impressions, and thought processes of the investigator 
as specific investigatory work-product.”147 This is where the Chief 
Justice found parallels between Ohio public records law and Hickman v. 
Taylor. Work-product doctrine has often been thought of as less of a 
privilege and more of a protection of the adversarial system.148 The 
thought process is much the same here, but, being that this is a criminal 
law context, the “protection” extends past the adversarial system and 
into the realm of protecting witnesses and victims. The Chief Justice 
believed that deference should be given to police departments and the 
records subject to in camera review when challenged.149 
While the rule laid out by the dissent seems sensible at first blush, it 
is no more than a call for a return to the Steckman status quo. The 
delineation between “facts” and “mental impressions” in the course of 
police investigation seems entirely arbitrary. This would only broaden 
the amount of investigatory work product exempted from discovery 
because police departments could easily claim that any resuscitation of 
the facts was a mental impression exempt from disclosure. If anything, 
such a sweeping exception would lead to more litigation about what 
“facts” and “mental impressions” are under the new Crim.R. 16. 
Particularly in the postconviction context, investigative reports are an 
integral part of proving official misconduct. When coupled with the 
 
 145. Id. at 613-14.  
 146. Id. at 613. 
 147. Id. at 613. 
 148. Sherman L. Cohn, Work Product Doctrine: Protection, Not Privilege, 70 GEO. L. J. 917 
(1984). 
 149. See Caster, 89 N.E.3d at 611 (O’Connor, C.J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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duration of the exception, exempting them from disclosure would 
seriously inhibit the ability of defendants to pursue postconviction relief. 
Again, the Larkins case operates as a prime example. 
Lastly, the idea that criminals will use public records to their 
advantage was an interesting argument. It is not something this author 
has ever thought about as an issue with public records, and the dissent’s 
argument was unpersuasive. The line “it prevents the actual perpetrator 
from accessing information that he or she could use to prevent 
detection,” is one ungrounded in apparent fact.150 There was no data to 
support that particular claim, making it appear as a hypothetical 
masquerading as a public policy argument. Regardless of the truth of the 
claim, that problem seems to evade another public policy issue: 
transparency.  
Immediately preceding his discussion of criminality and public 
records, the Chief Justice harped on the need for a judicial system in 
which the press does not “tr[y] an active case in the news.”151 While 
there are always concerns about public vigilantism, steadfast reporting is 
integral in the healthy operation of a government. Availability of public 
records holds the government accountable for its mistakes. As noted in a 
law review comment between the 2010 Crim.R. 16 amendment and 
State ex rel. Caster, “[i]n a news world corded by public information 
officers, press releases, and spin doctors, reporters rely on public 
documents to expose the unvarnished facts about government 
activity.”152 This rings particularly true in the postconviction context. 
Journalists are necessary members of the criminal justice system 
because of their capacity to hold the government accountable. In Ohio 
alone, journalists play an integral part in exposing corruption, 
misconduct, and injustice to the public at large. Several Ohio Innocence 
Project cases have reached the media to discuss those issues 
explicitly.153 There was a particularly large campaign in Ohio in 2006 to 
 
 150. Id. at 615. 
 151. Id.  
 152. Aker, supra note 31, at 367. 
 153. Kyle Swenson, A Cleveland Man Fights to Prove His Innocence in a System Incapable of 
Correcting its Own Mistakes: Drug dealer and street hustler? Yes. But killer?, CLEVELAND SCENE (June 
29, 2016), https://www.clevescene.com/cleveland/a-cleveland-man-fights-to-prove-his-innocence-in-a-
system-that-appears-incapable-of-correcting-its-own-mistakes/Content?oid=4906687; Kyle Swenson, A 
Tiny Piece of Evidence Could be the Key to Setting an Innocent Cleveland Man Free. Why Can’t 
Anyone at the Justice Center Find It?, CLEVELAND SCENE (June 14, 2017), 
https://www.clevescene.com/cleveland/a-tiny-piece-of-evidence-could-be-the-key-to-setting-an-
innocent-cleveland-man-free-why-cant-anyone-at-the-justice-center-find-it/Content?oid=8017989; 
Leslie Blade, Bloody Shoes and Snitches: Damn the DNA – the State of Ohio says Jerome Campbell has 
to die, CITY BEAT (April 9, 2003), http://www.citybeat.com/home/article/13021608/cover-story-bloody-
shoes-and-snitches. 
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raise awareness for wrongful convictions.154 These cases relied heavily 
on public records. In sum, the dissents’ public policy arguments favor an 
opaqueness that does not necessarily benefit society at large; rather, that 
opaqueness seems to benefit the prosecution. 
The three major themes extracted from the dissent are all rebuttable, 
though it does not mean they are without merit. The work-product 
argument is particularly persuasive. Reasonable minds can differ on how 
and when public records should be exempted, but a return to the status 
quo only makes it more difficult for defendants to adequately obtain 
postconviction relief. 
C.  Looking Forward 
The full effects of State ex rel. Caster are yet to be seen. 
Postconviction work is a long and difficult process. It will likely be 
several years until courts and attorneys for sure know how the new 
interpretation of the rule will act in practice.   
Regardless, access to public records at an earlier time will 
undoubtedly have an impact on both direct appeals and postconviction 
relief. That was, of course, the purpose of the litigation in the first place. 
Whether the courts become inundated and slowed with public records 
disputes – as the dissent seemed to imagine – is also a question that 
there will not be an answer to for several years. There are several hopes 
as to what can be accomplished. 
Better access to public records will hopefully lead to an expanded 
capacity of appellate attorneys and defense attorneys to access 
information beneficial to their clients. Given the number of exonerations 
in Ohio in the past 30 years, it is likely that there are many more 
innocent people sitting in prison. State ex rel. Caster will hopefully lead 
to more meaningful and effective investigations into these claims of 
innocence.  
Also, such discovery will hopefully be beneficial in holding the State 
accountable to its citizens. In the same vein as investigating claims of 
actual innocence, investigating claims of official misconduct will 
become easier with expanded access to records. All investigations, of 
course, are in the name of fairness in equity in criminal proceedings. 
IV.  CONCLUSION   
Public records are now more public in the state of Ohio than they 
 
 154. Ohio Investigative series identifies 30 inmates in need of DNA tests, INNOCENCEPROJECT 
(January 31, 2008), https://www.innocenceproject.org/ohio-investigative-series-identifies-30-inmates-
in-need-of-dna-tests/.  
20
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss2/12
2018] CASTER AND EXPANSION OF OHIO PUBLIC RECORDS LAW 891 
have been since 1993. State ex rel. Caster v. City of Columbus 
represents an expansive shift in Ohio public records law. Although State 
ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson was a seemingly sensible way to deal with 
issues plaguing the trial courts, it led to a progeny of cases that limited 
defendants’ abilities to meaningfully pursue relief on appeal.  
The passage of the 2010 amendments of Crim.R. 16 created a more 
equitable discovery process at the trial level, and State ex rel. Caster did 
not set out to disturb that newly found equity. Instead, it opened files at 
the appellate process to act as a necessary check on the State. Though 
the effects of the decision are yet to be fully seen, the case will, in 
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